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After the launch scrub of Space Shuttle mission STS-133 on November 5, 2010, large 
cracks were discovered in two of the External Tank intertank stringers.  The NASA 
Marshall Space Flight Center, as managing center for the External Tank Project, 
coordinated the ensuing failure investigation and repair activities with several organizations, 
including the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin.  To support the investigation, the Marshall 
Space Flight Center formed an ad-hoc stress analysis team to complement the efforts of 
Lockheed Martin.  The team undertook six major efforts to analyze or test the structural 
behavior of the stringers.  Extensive finite element modeling was performed to characterize 
the local stresses in the stringers near the region of failure.  Data from a full-scale tanking 
test and from several subcomponent static load tests were used to confirm the analytical 
conclusions.  The analysis and test activities of the team are summarized.  The root cause of 
the stringer failures and the flight readiness rationale for the repairs that were implemented 
are discussed. 
I. Introduction 
n November 5, 2010, the launch of Space Shuttle mission STS-133 was scrubbed after propellant loading due to 
a gaseous hydrogen leak at the ground umbilical connection to the External Tank (ET).  During visual 
inspections following the scrub, a large crack in the ET sprayed-on foam insulation (SOFI) was observed at the 
forward end of the intertank near the interface to the liquid oxygen (LOX) tank (Figure 1).  Cracks in the foam were 
not typical in this region and violated a launch constraint due to debris concerns, necessitating a foam repair before 
any future launch attempt.   
Removal of the damaged foam revealed that an underlying aluminum hat-section stringer had cracked 
approximately 9 inches along each side, just inboard of the fasteners that attached the stringer “feet” to the intertank 
forward flange chord (Figure 2).  The crack in the foam was solely a result of the stringer failure.  An adjacent 
stringer was also found to be similarly cracked on each side for about 3 inches along its forward end, although the 
SOFI directly over it had appeared undamaged.   
This event is thought to be the first known in-service failure of ET metallic structure in the more than 30-year 
history of the ET project. The NASA Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC), as managing center for the ET Project, 
coordinated the ensuing failure investigation and repair activities with multiple organizations, including the ET 
prime contractor (Lockheed Martin Space Systems – Michoud Operations), the Space Shuttle Program Office at the 
NASA Johnson Space Center (JSC), the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and the NASA Engineering and 
Safety Center (NESC).  As part of the cause and corrective action assessments, several structural analyses and static 
load tests of stringers were conducted by the engineering organizations at the MSFC to complement the efforts of 
Lockheed Martin.  The objective of this paper is to provide a synopsis of the failure investigation and development 
of flight readiness rationale from the perspective of the MSFC stress analysis team. 
II. Background 
The Space Shuttle ET contains and delivers the liquid hydrogen (LH2) and LOX propellants for the Orbiter‟s 
three main engines.  It also serves as the structural backbone of the Space Transportation System, providing for 
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attachment of the Orbiter and the Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) [1].  The ET is comprised of three primary 
structural elements: an aft LH2 tank and a forward LOX tank separated by an intertank (Figure 3).   
The intertank is an unpressurized, stiffened cylindrical structure that serves as the structural connection between 
the two propellant tanks and also functions to receive and distribute all thrust loads from the SRBs.  It is an 
assembly of eight curved panels that are mechanically joined into a barrel with five internal ring frames.  The SRBs 
attach to a box beam that extends across the diameter of the intertank at the middle ring.  The two intertank panels 
located at each end of the SRB beam react a majority of the SRB thrust loads and are manufactured from thick plate 
as one-piece panels with integrally machined blade stiffeners and pocketed membrane areas.  The other six intertank 
panels are skin/stringer panels manufactured from sheet metal skins and externally-mounted, hat-section stringer 
stiffeners (Figure 4).  The stringers are mechanically attached with rivets along most of their length and with 
specialty fasteners, such as GP Lockbolts and Hi-Loks, at the forward and aft ends where the stringers attach to 
flange chords (Figure 5).  The chords at the forward and aft ends of the stringer panels are extruded, stretch-formed 
aluminum angle-section that provide a mating flange for mechanically fastening the intertank to the ring frames of 
the adjacent propellant tanks.  The hat-section stringers are fabricated from aluminum sheet with a combination of 
rolling and hot-forming processes.  There are 18 stringers per panel, located on approximately 7-inch centers. 
Over the course of the project history, there have been two major revisions of the ET design to decrease 
structural weight.  The general structural configuration of the intertank remained unchanged throughout those 
changes; however, the last major evolution from Lightweight Tank (LWT) to the Super Lightweight Tank (SLWT) 
involved a widespread change of skin/stringer material from aluminum alloy Al-2024 to aluminum-lithium alloy Al-
2090 [2].  The ET used with STS-133 (serial number ET-137) was the forty-second SLWT manufactured.  All ETs 
were manufactured by Lockheed Martin (formerly Martin Marietta) at the NASA Michoud Assembly Facility 
(MAF) in New Orleans, LA. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. SOFI crack after STS-133 launch scrub. 
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Figure 2. Stringer cracks discovered after STS-133 launch scrub.  ET-137 stringer S7-2 shown.  (Bottom left 
inset: stringer S7-2 after removal from ET-137 and foam residue cleaned off.) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Super Lightweight External Tank. 
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Figure 4. ET intertank and stringer panel assembly.  
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III. Initial Response 
Work began immediately within the 
Shuttle community to understand root 
cause and scope of the stringer issue and 
plan for repair of the two cracked 
stringers and surrounding SOFI.  There 
was an emphasis to minimize delay of 
the next launch attempt, but without 
compromising flight safety.  The two 
cracked stringers were located on the side 
of the ET adjacent to the Space Shuttle 
Orbiter on the intertank skin/stringer 
panel closest to the port SRB (identified 
as panel 2 as shown in Figure 6).  Non-
destructive x-ray inspection was used in-
situ at the launch pad to examine the 
forward and aft ends of the remaining 
stringers on the side of the intertank 
adjacent to the Orbiter, with the 
exception of the aft end of a few stringers 
in close proximity to the Orbiter where 
clearance and access issues precluded 
inspection.  Of the stringers inspected, no 
additional cracks were detected.  
However, the orientation of the ET relative to the launch pad fixed and rotating support structures was such that no 
access was possible at the pad to perform x-ray inspection of any of the stringers on the opposite side of the 
intertank (farthest from the Orbiter). 
The two stringers were repaired in-
situ at the launch pad by removing 
several inches of the forward end of each 
damaged stringer and splicing on an 
equivalent length taken from new 
stringers.  Aluminum sheet stock 
doublers formed into a shape resembling 
the letter „Z‟ were overlaid and fastened 
on the splice location to mechanically tie 
each portion of new stringer to the 
remaining portion of original stringer.  
The SOFI was then manually re-applied, 
allowed to cure, and trimmed to meet 
flight requirements.  The remnants of the 
two stringers containing the cracks were 
shipped first to the MAF and later to the 
MSFC for forensic engineering. 
Concurrent with these efforts, 
Lockheed Martin began to review the 
structural verification of the SLWT 
intertank stringers.  Launch pad 
observation video recorded during 
propellant loading for the launch attempt 
was reviewed to determine the time of 
SOFI failure, which indicated the time of 
the underlying stringer failure.  By 
correlating the time of video observations 
to the propellant loading schedule, it was 
 
Figure 6. ET-137 intertank panel identification numbers and 
cracked stringer locations. 
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Figure 5. LOX end stringer, skin, and chord assembly. 
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determined that the stringer failed at about the same time that the LOX liquid level reached the LOX tank ring frame 
to which the forward end of the intertank was bolted.  Hence, cryogenically-induced deflections were suspected as a 
contributing cause of the stringer cracks.  However, the LOX loading procedure was nominal, and the cryogenically-
induced deflections were theorized to be no different than for previous ETs.   
The LOX cryogenic temperatures cause a radial shrinkage of the aft ring frame of the LOX tank as the liquid 
level reaches that elevation during propellant loading.  The forward flange chords of the intertank are bolted to the 
LOX tank frame and are constrained to follow this displacement.  However, since the intertank is a dry structure that 
does not contain cryogenic propellant, a large temperature gradient exists at the forward end of the intertank.  
Bending is induced in the stringers as the forward end of the intertank deflects radially inward, but the warmer aft 
areas do not.  This bending attempts to pry the stringer ends from the chords and skin, which is resisted by the 
mechanical fasteners attaching the feet of the stringers to the underlying structure, causing local bending in the 
stringer feet inboard of the fasteners (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Notional cryo-induced stringer deflection due to LOX liquid level. 
 
One of the early reviews Lockheed Martin performed of the structural capability of the stringer feet used an 
existing methodology for the analysis of classic aircraft details.  As can be seen in Figure 8, it was noted that the free 
body diagram of the cross section of a stringer foot was similar to that of an aircraft structural detail commonly 
known as a “tension clip” or “tee.”  A modified version of the heritage Lockheed stress memo, “Flange Bending 
Strength of Angles,” provided a standard analysis procedure for tension clips based on empirically-derived 
allowable tension loads for sheet metal angles [3].  Using stringer sidewall forces derived from expected thermal 
deflections and nominal stringer geometry and properties, the tension clip analysis indicated that the stringers should 
have had adequate structural capability.  The analysis did not explain the failures. 
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To check the validity of using the heritage analysis 
methodology for this application, Lockheed Martin 
conducted simple tension tests on cross sections of spare 
stringers obtained from the production inventory (Figure 
9).  Referred to as “clip tests,” the test articles were 
essentially one-inch lengths of the stringer hat section 
with one fastener through each of the two stringer feet 
anchoring the clip to a rigid base.  A load frame was 
used to pull the clips away from the base, simulating the 
local loading condition created when radial contraction 
of the forward end of the intertank causes the stringers 
to bend.  The initial clip tests confirmed that the 
analysis method was conservative in that the test articles 
demonstrated higher capability than predicted by 
analysis.     
Within two weeks of the scrubbed launch attempt, 
repairs to the two cracked stringers and surrounding 
SOFI were completed.  However, root cause of the 
stringer failures was still unidentified, and it was 
unclear what rationale for flight readiness existed for an 
unexplained anomaly that: (1) posed the risk of 
catastrophic foam debris should it reoccur and (2) raised 
questions regarding the basic structural integrity of the 
intertank during flight. 
IV. Failure Investigation Activities 
The investigation into the cause of the structural 
failure of the stringers can be summarized as having 
pursued the scenario that either the stringer capability 
was less than expected or that the stresses were greater 
than expected.  Each of these two possible causes was 
further developed into their potential sub-causes 
(Figure 10).  Within the effort at the MSFC, these two 
main branches were the focus of an ad-hoc Material 
Failure Analysis Team (FAT) and an ad-hoc Stress 
Analysis Team, respectively. 
Given the successful flight history of the SLWT 
design and seemingly routine, benign loads at the time 
of stringer failure, it seemed most likely early in the 
investigation that an anomalous material defect or 
under-strength issue would be at cause.  However, 
fractography conducted at the MSFC of the remnants 
of the two cracked stringers revealed there were no pre-
existing cracks or defects and that the stringers 
fractured in overload with no evidence of fatigue [4, 5].  
More precisely, the failures initiated near the second 
and third fasteners (from the chord) due to initial bend 
crack formation in mode I tension on the bottom of the 
stringer feet, propagating through the thickness, where 
mode III tearing opened the cracks fully along the 
stringer feet.  Additionally, testing of coupons cut from 
the remnants concluded that the stringers satisfied the 
material specification requirements for minimum 
ultimate tensile strength, minimum yield tensile 
strength, and elongation.   
 
Figure 8. Stringer foot free-body diagram 
similarity to aircraft “tension clip.” 
 
Figure 9. Lockheed Martin stringer “clip test.” 
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Figure 10. Simplified stringer failure fault tree. 
 
The stress analysis and structural testing activities at the MSFC evolved into six major efforts:  
(1) finite element analyses of the forward end (LOX tank end) of the stringers to understand fundamental 
structural responses to transient, cryogenically-induced temperature gradients, and to quantify stresses 
induced by possible assembly conditions;  
(2) analyses of photogrammetric deflection data of the intertank stringers collected during a tanking test 
conducted as part of the investigation;  
(3) finite element analyses of retro-fit structural reinforcements added to all Al-2090 stringers;  
(4) static load testing and corresponding finite element analyses of stringers to study their behavior when 
subjected to flight-like deflections and to assess the effectiveness of the retro-fit structural modification;  
(5) finite element analyses of a heritage, flight-like skin/stringer panel compression test to understand structural 
stability implications; and  
(6) finite element analyses of the aft end (LH2 tank end) of the stringers to quantify stresses induced by 
deflections resulting from the transient thermal environments at the interface between the intertank and the 
LH2 tank. 
The analysis efforts of the MSFC Stress Team were conducted concurrently with the test and analysis efforts of 
all other participants in the overall investigation, including the Material FAT, Lockheed Martin, and the NESC.  The 
MSFC analysis strategy was adjusted as new information became available.  Teleconferences were held at least 
weekly to discuss structural analysis details with Lockheed Martin, engineering representatives of the Space Shuttle 
Program, and the NESC.  The six major MSFC analysis efforts are further described in the following sections. 
A. Finite Element Analyses of Stringer Prelaunch, Flight, and Assembly Conditions at the LOX Tank 
Interface 
As mentioned previously, an early focus of the stress analysis investigation was on studying the cryogenically-
induced deflections during the transient temperature conditions resulting from the prelaunch operation of filling the 
LOX tank.  However, failing to show that expected cryogenically-induced deflections explained the stringer failures, 
Lockheed Martin began to study the possible contribution of off-nominal assembly-induced stresses in the feet of 
the stringer.  The MSFC Stress Team began an independent analysis effort to confirm Lockheed Martin‟s findings, 
and to gain understanding of the structural behavior so as to be able to provide knowledgeable opinions to NASA 
engineering and project management. 
Finite element (FE) models were created to study deflections and stress conditions along the feet of the stringers.  
These MSFC analyses were conducted using the ANSYS
†
 commercial finite element code with progressively more 
detailed models.  Three-dimensional, 8-node brick elements were used, and the rotational symmetry of the intertank 
stringer panels and LOX tank was utilized such that only one-half of a stringer and the underlying skin were 
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modeled (Figure 11).  Different models were created to replicate the different configurations of stringer and 
underlying skin that existed circumferentially around the intertank.  Portions of the adjacent LOX tank ring, barrel, 
and aft dome were modeled to provide appropriate boundary conditions.  Runs were made with simplified 
representations of the fasteners and with the fasteners explicitly modeled with solid elements.  Different profiles of 
stringer temperature as a function of distance from the LOX tank interface (representing snapshots in time of the 
transient thermal conditions) were mapped onto the mesh to study resulting stringer deflections and stresses.  The 
stringer model with the steady state temperature profile achieved while filling the LOX tank was further augmented 
with compressive loads to study stresses in the feet of the stringer under the influence of ascent flight loads [6].  
Linear elastic material properties were used.  Additionally, it was acknowledged that the magnitude of the peak 
stresses from the analysis could not be stated with sufficient accuracy to calculate a meaningful factor of safety or 
failure margin because it was just a linear analysis, and it was unclear what material allowable should be used.  
Rather, the results were used for qualitative comparisons of stringer response to different thermal profiles, flight 
loads, and underlying skin configuration. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. FE model of stringer and adjacent LOX tank structure. 
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Initially, only the nominal skin/stringer, as-designed configurations were modeled.  Results were obtained for 
stringer displacement, chord rotation, internal forces in the sidewall of the stringer, and stresses in the feet of the 
stringer (Figure 12).  The results indicated that: 
 Local peak stresses in the region of the first three fasteners (where the fractography indicated that the failures 
had initiated) occurred during the temperature profiles corresponding to the LOX liquid level reaching the 
ring frame to which the intertank forward chord was attached; 
 The different skin configurations under the stringers had an effect, with the stringers closest to the thrust 
panels (where doubler skins were used and where the first observed stringer failure occurred) seeing higher 
peak local stresses at the forward fasteners due to transient thermal conditions.  (Recall that fractography 
indicated that the failures initiated in the region near the second fastener from the chord.) 
 Local peak stresses in the region of fastener locations 4 through 9 resulted from steady state thermal 
conditions combined with ascent flight loads.
‡
  
 
 
Figure 12. Example FE result of stringer foot 1
st
 principal stress on the bottom of the foot at 
the 3700 sec thermal transient. 
 
Other stringer analyses were conducted with this FE model to study possible flight worthiness rationale.  Some 
engineers had questioned whether the stringers experienced greater peak stresses during prelaunch propellant 
loading operations compared to flight such that if the stringers did not fail during prelaunch, they would be unlikely 
to fail during flight.  In other words, did propellant loading act as a pseudo proof test on the stringers for flight 
environments?  If true, such logic would have been potentially useful in a flight readiness assessment for the next 
launch attempt in that the stringers would have been “proofed” by exposure to the prelaunch environments of the 
initial launch attempt.  (Recall that most of the stringers had been non-destructively inspected and structural integrity 
confirmed following the scrubbed launch attempt.)  The FE results indicated that generally the region near the first 
three fasteners experienced peak stress during propellant loading, but the region around the next several fasteners 
experienced peak stress during flight, although the magnitude of those peaks was not typically as high.  It was not 
conclusive that definitive proof test logic for the flight readiness rationale existed.   
These same FE models were modified as necessary to study stresses resulting from possible assembly fit-up 
conditions.  The design drawings of the stringer panels specified that shims were to be used when attaching a 
stringer to a skin panel if a gap greater than 0.030 inches existed between the stringer foot and skin.  One theory for 
unexpected stresses was that gap conditions existed during assembly that required shimming, but that the shims had 
been inadvertently omitted, inducing high residual stresses in the stringer feet during fastener installation.  This 
theory was studied with the FE model by including excessive (but credible) gaps under several fasteners at the end 
of the stringer, and then simulating preloading of the fasteners, followed by application of thermal deflections 
(Figure 13).  The anomalous gap conditions hypothesized in these analyses did not introduce significant additional 
stresses above the baseline as-designed conditions, so it was considered unlikely that these particular conditions 
contributed to the failure. 
Another source of possible assembly-induced stresses was theorized to be variations in the stringer geometry at 
the hot-formed ends that were fastened to the chord.  Visual examination of typical stringers showed that the feet of 
the stringer hat-section exhibited a slight taper as a result of the forming process (what was referred to as a “toe 
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the end-most fastener (closest to the adjacent propellant tank) is labeled fastener number one, and the adjacent 
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down” condition) as seen in Figure 14.  An initial toe down geometric condition would cause bending in the stringer 
foot during fastener installation, resulting in stresses in the foot that would be additive to stresses caused by the 
prelaunch thermal transient.  This condition was studied analytically by giving the FE model an initial toe down 
condition, and sequential installation (preloading) of the forward fasteners was simulated to obtain stringer internal 
forces and stresses.  The results indicated that it was possible to induce assembly stresses that would be additive to 
subsequent cryogenic deflection-induced stresses. 
 
 
Figure 13. FE simulations of possible assembly stress scenarios. 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Stringer “toe down” geometry variation at the hot formed ends. 
 
B. Tanking Test Photogrammetry Analysis 
Early into the failure investigation, the Space Shuttle Program decided to conduct an instrumented tanking test of 
ET-137 to collect data to help understand the stringer failures.  A tanking test is where propellants are loaded into 
the ET, generally following the same procedures used in preparation for a launch.  This test had four goals: (1) to 
gather full-scale environmental data to assist in anchoring analyses; (2) to look for a global structural issue with the 
intertank rather than a local stringer issue (e.g., “oil-canning”); (3) to confirm the integrity of repairs that had already 
been effected on two of the cracked stringers; and (4) to verify re-alignment of the Ground Umbilical Carrier Plate 
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(GUCP), which had been the source of the hydrogen leak that caused the November 5 launch scrub [7].  The test 
included pressurization of the LOX and LH2 tanks to flight pressure. 
Special instrumentation for the test included 21 strain gage rosettes and 40 thermocouples mounted externally to 
the skin and stringers on two intertank panels near the LOX tank interface, including one of the stringers that had 
previously been repaired.  SOFI was removed in the instrumented regions to allow for application of the gages and 
thermocouples, and then the SOFI was reapplied over the instrumentation so the thermal boundary conditions during 
the tanking test matched those seen during the previous launch preparations.  Instrumentation on the internal side of 
the intertank skin was ruled out due to access issues inside the intertank in the region of interest, concerns over the 
routing of the wiring harnesses that would be required, logistics concerns over the number of strain gages 
immediately available, and schedule concerns.  Instrumentation at the ends of the stringers near the LH2 tank was 
ruled out since the cryo-pumping phenomenon greatly raised debris concerns with modifying and then repairing the 
SOFI in the region of the LH2 tank flange. 
Engineers at the MSFC strongly advocated for an attempt to use photogrammetry to measure deflections of the 
stringers and intertank forward chord.  Photogrammetry is a non-contact optical method that uses stereographic 
digital image correlation to measure deformation on a surface.  It requires the application of specular markers to map 
the deformation.  Since the SOFI was required to be in place during the tanking test, the photogrammetry required 
painting a speckle (dot) pattern on the external surface of the foam (Figure 15).  Approval was granted to try 
photogrammetry on two regions of the intertank on approximately opposite sides of the intertank from each other 
[8].  The field of view of the camera systems limited both regions of study to the forward ends of several stringers 
and the adjacent LOX tank area. 
 
 
Figure 15. ET-137 tanking test photogrammetry study of stringer deflections near the LOX tank. 
 
The test successfully met all goals.  There were no observations of unexpected structural behavior.  Strain, 
temperature, and deflection data were successfully collected.  All measured stresses were thought to be well within 
the capability of the design; however, correlation to models was difficult due to the limited instrumentation.  The 
thermocouple data was correlated to a thermal analysis model of the transient temperature conditions.  Post-test 
visual and non-destructive inspection of the two stringer repairs was completed with no anomalies identified [9].  
The GUCP performed nominally with no leaks detected. 
Of the two intertank regions studied with photogrammetry, only one of the regions provided data with sufficient 
quality for meaningful study.  The data was subsequently analyzed to discern cryogenically-induced deflections 
from rigid body movement during the tanking test.  It was assumed that deflections of the outer surface of the SOFI 
were essentially the same as the underlying stringers and flanges.  Through mathematical post-processing of the 
data, the radial contraction of the forward end of the intertank due to cryogenic temperatures and the resulting 
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bending of the stringers was quantified 
and compared to ANSYS FE predictions 
from the effort previously mentioned.  
The FE analysis had shown that the 
stresses in the stringer feet were 
particularly sensitive to how much the 
forward chord rotated during the thermal-
induced deflections, but the accuracy with 
which the FE model predicted the chord 
rotations had been the subject of some 
debate as it did not agree with other 
analyses.  However, as shown in Figure 
16, the photogrammetry data indicated 
that the ANSYS model very accurately 
predicted the average radial deflection 
and rotation of the intertank forward 
chord [10]. 
 
While the tanking test achieved all 
goals and the data it provided was useful 
in confirming the gross structural 
response of the intertank during 
propellant loading, it failed to provide any 
further insight into the cause of the 
stringer cracks.  Following the tanking 
test, the program management made the 
decision to roll the Space Shuttle stack 
back to the Vehicle Assembly Building 
(VAB) where additional work platforms 
existed to perform x-ray inspections of 
the stringers that could not be reached on 
the launch pad.  This inspection revealed 
three additional stringers with similar 
cracks in their feet near the LOX tank 
interface, making a total of five known 
stringer failures, two of which had 
already been repaired (Figures 17 and 
18).  All three of the newly detected 
cracked stringers were located in the area 
where good quality photogrammetry data 
was collected, but no indication of the 
stringer failures was indicated on the 
surface of the SOFI or in the 
photogrammetry data.  Since these three 
stringers had not been inspected prior to 
the tanking test, it was not known if the 
cracks occurred as a result of the tanking 
test or if they occurred during LOX 
loading for the original launch attempt as 
with the other failures.  The three 
stringers were repaired similarly to the 
original two cracked stringers.  No cracks 
were detected at the stringer ends near the 
LH2 tank. 
 
Figure 16. Intertank forward chord rotation due to 
thermal transient. 
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Figure 17. Example stringer crack detected during post-
tanking test x-ray inspection. 
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Sidebar: Anomalous Material Behavior 
By about the sixth week of the failure 
investigation, the findings of the Material 
FAT were increasingly suggesting that an 
out-of-family material behavior that was 
not controlled by the material acceptance 
requirements was a likely contributor to the 
crack failures.  Specifically, testing of 
remnants of the failed stringers indicated 
higher than typical yield tensile strength 
and lower than typical fracture toughness.  
(The material exceeded the minimum 
specification requirement for yield tensile 
strength; fracture toughness was not a 
requirement in the material specification.)  
In addition to the lower than typical 
fracture toughness, fracture tests of the 
failed stringer remnant material 
demonstrated unstable fracture (tearing 
resistance) compared to control samples.  
This out-of-family behavior was eventually 
traced to stringers manufactured from two 
specific lots of Al-2090 sheet.  Lockheed 
Martin determined that more than half of 
the approximately 100 stringers on ET-137 were likely from either of the two suspect material lots (the stringers 
were not serialized, lot traceable items, so this could not be conclusively determined).  Since only five of the suspect 
stringers had cracked, the material behavior was not thought to be the sole cause of the failures. 
C. Finite Element Analyses of Radius Block Reinforcements 
Lockheed Martin proposed the corrective action of retro-fitting the feet on every Al-2090 stringer with structural 
reinforcement in the region of the first several attachment fasteners at the forward end of the intertank.  These 
reinforcements, known as “radius blocks” because they fit into the radius between the stringer sidewall and foot, 
were 0.190-inch thick strips of aluminum alloy Al-2024 and were mechanically fastened to the outside of the 
stringer feet (Figure 19).  Similar reinforcements were already in use by design on stringers near cutouts in the 
intertank.  The repair required the removal and replacement of several of the forward stringer attachment fasteners.  
However, due to the risk of possible collateral damage to the LOX tank dome in removing the forward-most 
fastener, this fastener was untouched, and the radius blocks did not cover the stringer feet at the forward fastener. 
Several FE analyses were conducted by 
the MSFC Stress Team to study the effect 
of the radius blocks in reducing stresses in 
the stringer feet due to prelaunch and flight 
environments.  Additionally, the analyses 
were conducted to ensure that the repair 
“did no harm;” i.e., to ensure that the 
radius blocks did not create unintended and 
detrimental stress concentrations, 
particularly at the forward and aft edges of 
the radius block. 
One series of analyses used modified 
versions of the ANSYS models previously 
mentioned.  The radius block and fasteners 
were explicitly modeled, contact was 
simulated between the radius block and the 
stringer foot, and linear elastic material 
properties were used.  The models did not 
 
Figure 18. Location of additional stringer cracks detected after 
ET-137 tanking test and roll-back to the VAB. 
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Figure 19. Radius block reinforcement of stringer feet. 
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include any features to simulate possible sources of assembly stress.  By running critical load cases of the model 
with and without a radius block, and plotting the principle stress patterns on the underside of the stringer foot, it was 
possible to study whether the addition of the radius block changed the shape or magnitudes of the stress contour and 
to qualitatively determine radius block effectiveness (Figure 20).  The findings of this assessment were: 
 The addition of the radius block did not add new high stress regions; 
 The stress in the foot of the stringer in the region near the first five fasteners during the critical thermal 
transient was significantly reduced with addition of the radius block; 
 The stress in the foot of the stringer in the region near the fasteners at the aft end of the radius block saw only 
moderate increases with the addition of radius blocks for the steady state thermal condition with ascent 
compressive loads, but the stress remained low relative to the magnitude of the stresses near the forward 
fasteners. 
 
Figure 20. Example FE results comparison of stringer foot (with single doubler) 1
st
 principal stress (psi) on 
the bottom of the foot at the 3700 sec thermal transient with and without radius block reinforcement. 
 
Parametric analyses were conducted to study radius block performance in the presence of allowable dimensional 
tolerance stack-up conditions between the stringer foot and radius block.  The parametric analyses used a FE model 
of the Lockheed Martin clip test geometry.  The purpose was not to compare analytical predictions to test results, but 
rather to use the simple sub-component test article geometry as an analytical test bed for understanding the 
sensitivity of stringer feet stresses and strains to dimensional variation.  These analyses were conducted using the 
ABAQUS
§
 commercial FE code.  Three-dimensional brick elements were used to model the geometry of the clip 
tests.  The sensitivity of stringer feet stresses and strains to tolerance conditions was studied by parametrically 
varying the model geometry for conditions such as fastener location relative to the sidewall of the hat stringer, both 
with and without radius blocks (Figure 21).  The results showed that the radius blocks significantly mitigated strains 
induced by some credible tolerance conditions. 
                                                          
§
 ABAQUS is a registered trademark of Dassault Systèmes. 
Small stress increase in radius
Some level of stress 
decrease observed 
around fastener 1
(a) 3700 sec without Radius Block
(b) 3700 sec with Radius Block 
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Figure 21. Parametric analyses of clip test specimens with and without radius blocks. 
 
D. Static Load Testing of Stringers 
Planning began very early in the investigation for some type of static load testing of stringers should such data be 
needed to support the investigation or to support structural re-certification.  It was decided almost immediately that 
the test would need to simulate the cryogenically-induced deflections that cause stringer bending.  Questions raised 
during planning sessions included whether the test needed to be conducted at cryogenic temperatures, whether the 
test needed to include compressive loads on the stringers, and whether the test articles could be individual stringers 
or whether edge effects would require the test article to be a panel with several adjacent stringers.  The aggressive 
schedule of the investigation led to an approach to start simple, but plan for additional test capabilities to be added 
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later if needed.  Thus, it was decided the initial tests would be to simulate cryogenic deflections on an individual 
stringer (with underlying skin and chord) in a room temperature environment.  The test apparatus was designed to 
accommodate a panel with up to three stringers if needed, and it was designed so that the capability to apply 
compressive load on the stringers could be added in the future. 
The test apparatus for what would eventually become colloquially known as “single stringer bending tests” was 
assembled at the MSFC Materials Environment Test Complex (METCO) facility.  The test configuration is shown in 
Figure 22.  Each stringer test article was approximately 40 inches long and consisted of the forward end of a single 
stringer attached via actual flight fasteners to an approximately 5-inch wide cross-section of skin, extruded shim, 
and chord.  The stringer test article was anchored to the test fixture at the aft end.  At the forward end, the article was 
attached to load blocks with a single bolt through the chord simulating the local attachment of the intertank chord to 
the LOX tank ring frame.  The load blocks were mounted on linear bearings to allow for axial and transverse 
stringer displacement but prevent free rotation of the chord.  A wedge-shaped shim, installed between the chord and 
load block, was used to fix the chord angle (relative to the load block) to the worst case value predicted by the 
ANSYS FE analysis and validated with the tanking test photogrammetry data.  A hydraulic jack was used to apply a 
transverse load, bending the stringer over two fixed, offset fulcra to simulate the cryogenically-induced 
displacements.  The location and offset of the fulcra were determined from basic thermal deflection calculations to 
induce a flight-like deformed shape into the stringer and to create maximum stresses in the feet of the stringer in the 
vicinity of the first few fasteners as predicted by the prelaunch analyses. 
 
 
Figure 22. Single stringer bending test setup. 
 
Initially, it had been envisioned by the stress analysts that the focus of testing would be to collect load, strain, 
and deflection data to validate the FE modeling approach used to study prelaunch and flight.  On the very first test 
runs it was seen that when stringers fabricated from suspect material were tested to failure in this apparatus, the 
crack failures experienced on ET-137 could be accurately reproduced; i.e., a sudden brittle fracture of the feet of the 
stringer just inboard of the fasteners (Figure 23).  The primary focus of the tests soon changed to become a study of 
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the relative performance of stringers subjected to repeatable load conditions.  The focus became to create a test bed 
to comparatively demonstrate the capability of stringers fabricated from suspect and nominal materials, each with 
and without radius blocks.  Approximately thirty stringers were tested, many of which were cut from the partially 
completed intertank for what would have been ET-139
**
.    Instrumentation data collected during each test came 
from linear variable-differential transformers (LVDTs) mounted to both the fixture and the stringer test specimen 
and strain gages mounted on the stringer.  Photogrammetry was used to great effect in the tests for full-field strain 
observation [11, 12].  High-speed digital video was also recorded. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. Similarity of failure between cracked stringer removed from ET-137 (bottom) and 
stringer bending test article after failure (top). 
 
                                                          
**
 Fabrication and assembly of ET-139 was halted at the direction of NASA when it was determined that the tank 
would not be needed to fly out the remaining missions of the Space Shuttle Program. 
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The test results showed definite trends in stringer performance:   
 Stringers fabricated from suspect material, and without added radius block modifications, failed in a sudden 
brittle fracture;  
 Stringers fabricated from nominal (non-suspect) material, and without radius blocks, failed in a progressive 
manner until rupture, which generally occurred at a higher load than unreinforced suspect material stringers; 
 Stringers fabricated from suspect material, but reinforced with radius blocks, failed at loads comparable to 
unreinforced, nominal material stringers, but the failure mode at rupture was still sudden brittle fracture; and 
 Stringers fabricated from nominal material, but reinforced with radius blocks, demonstrated as good or better 
performance than unreinforced, nominal material stringers. 
From these findings, and from review of the photogrammetry and instrumentation data, it was concluded that the 
radius blocks were effective in reducing stresses in the feet of the stringer and in restoring the structural performance 
of suspect material stringers to that of nominal material stringers.  The results also added confidence that the radius 
block repairs did not add unintended detrimental side effects such as local high stresses or significant change in 
overall stiffness [11, 13]. 
Finite element analyses of the stringer tests were conducted in an attempt complement the comparative results 
with analysis correlation to measured test data.  This correlation effort proved to be more difficult than anticipated.  
The findings and conclusions of the test program as listed above were able to stand alone in the flight readiness 
assessment without FE correlation.  However, the correlation study was continued even after the flight of STS-133 
to address the team‟s own concerns with the fidelity of the analyses, and if needed, to further bolster the structural 
verification of the ETs for the remaining two flights of the shuttle program.  Eventually, excellent correlation was 
achieved between the test prediction models and the measured data [12].   
E. Finite Element Analyses of a Stringer 
Panel Compression Test 
Since skin/stringer construction is used 
to provide structural stability, an early 
concern following the discovery of the ET-
137 stringer cracks was that intertank 
stability would need to be re-verified.  As 
part of the original SLWT verification 
program in the mid-1990s, a compression 
test of a flight-like stringer panel was 
conducted at the MSFC (Figure 24).  The 
test article was a five-stringer-wide panel 
that was half the length of an actual flight 
panel.  The test incorporated compressive 
loads and used an adjustable cryogenic base 
and rollers to simulate flight-like 
temperature conditions and thermal 
deflections at the LH2 end of the intertank 
(the location of the bounding compressive 
line loads) [14].  However, the fixturing for 
this test was dismantled and many parts 
scrapped following the conclusion of the 
original test program.  In case a similar test 
would be required for the current stringer 
failure investigation or the flight readiness 
rationale, FE analysis of this heritage test 
was pro-actively initiated for insight into the 
design and planning for a new test.  The 
MSFC Structures Test Lab was able to 
retrieve a digital archive of all the strain 
gage and LVDT data collected during the 
original 1995 test.  Based on information 
from the lab personnel, it was quickly 
 
 
Figure 24. SLWT stringer panel compression test 
article as tested in October 1995. 
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determined by the ET project management that the cost and schedule to re-create the 1995 test apparatus was 
prohibitive given that a definitive need to repeat the test had not yet been identified.  As an alternative, the project 
agreed to the stringer bending test effort described previously, with a contingency to modify that test for 
compressive loads if necessary. 
The modeling of the heritage compression test was continued, not for test planning purposes, but rather to 
conduct fail-safe stability assessments on a stringer panel model that could be correlated to test data.  Even though 
all known stringer cracks on ET-137 had been on the LOX tank end of the stringers, and this FE model was of the 
LH2 tank end of the stringers, it was recognized that the most severe compressive design loads in the intertank 
occurred at the LH2 tank interface, and it was decided that analysis of this test article would be insightful for 
determining structural capability.   
The heritage compression test panel was modeled using the ABAQUS commercial finite element code.  The 
finite element model was constructed primarily using shell elements with the fasteners modeled as linear elastic 
beam elements.  Contact was simulated between the stringers, frame chord, and panel skin.  Material plasticity was 
included in the skin and stringer materials. 
The panel compressive load capability was predicted using an incremental, non-linear static solution procedure 
in ABAQUS.  Several analysis steps were needed to adequately approximate the test through FE analysis. The first 
step involved preloading the fasteners to ensure contact between stringers, skin, and frame chord.  A second step 
applied thermal loads and simulated thermal displacement at the aft end of the panel.  A third step incrementally 
displaced the top of the panel to a load value just below the buckling load (~90%).  The final step increased the 
displacement at the top of the panel model into the post-buckled region and implemented static stabilization to aid in 
convergence. 
The model of the “as-tested” panel configuration correlated well with the measured test data retrieved from 
archive:  the global stability failure mode and location matched photographic records of the original test, and FE-
predicted stresses correlated well to those derived from strain gage measurements (Figure 25).  The FE model over-
predicted the compressive load at panel failure by almost 20%, but it was decided to address this unconservatism in 
subsequent iterations of the model through the use of a knockdown factor. 
With analysis of the as-tested panel configuration completed, the FE model was modified, first to better match 
the current flight configuration of the intertank skin/stringer panels, and then to simulate cracks in the feet of the 
stringers representative of those found on ET-137.  The changes to the panel configuration included adjustments to 
the skin thicknesses, increasing the thermal deflection to current estimates, and modifying the stringer material 
properties to match those of the suspect stringer lots (based on data from the FAT).  Various crack lengths and 
numbers of cracked stringers were analyzed to study the tolerance of intertank stability to damaged stringers.  It was 
concluded that cracks in only one stringer did not significantly affect the buckling capability of a panel, and multiple 
cracks in both feet of three adjacent stringers maintained a positive fail-safe margin of safety for stability (Figure 
26).  However, all scenarios with cracked stringers exhibited significant local skin buckling immediately under the 
stringers, which was identified as a concern for increasing the risk of foam debris due to potential SOFI debonding.   
The findings from the analyses for the different damaged configurations contributed to flight readiness rationale 
by adding confidence that moderate levels of undetected or new damage to the STS-133 intertank would likely 
maintain positive fail-safe margins of safety against structural collapse [15, 16].  
F. Finite Element Analysis of Stringer Prelaunch and Flight Conditions at the LH2 Tank Interface 
Concurrent with the other FE efforts previously described, another analysis task was initiated to obtain stresses, 
forces, and displacements at the LH2 tank end of the intertank stringers to support an assessment of risk associated 
with the potential for stringer cracks to develop during LH2 Tank Fill and Ascent transient loading conditions [17].  
A specific objective was to compare stringer peak tensile stresses and forces to corresponding results obtained from 
the separate FE analysis of the LOX tank end of the stringer, and from this comparison, make a determination on 
whether the propensity for stringer cracking at the LH2 tank end was more or less than the LOX tank end.  Recall 
that no cracks had been detected with x-ray inspections at the LH2 end of the stringers following two LH2 loading 
operations from the launch scrub and the tanking test, but that the radius block design modification was not to be 
incorporated on the LH2 tank end.  Another analysis objective was to determine if analytical results for the transient 
LH2 loading conditions bounded results for the ascent flight condition. 
To expedite this effort, the existing ANSYS FE model of the LOX tank end of the stringers was modified to take 
advantage of the similar geometry of the stringer, skin and chord.  Chord dimensions were modified as necessary to  
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Figure 25. Stringer panel compression test photograph compared to FE prediction of global 
stability failure (von Mises stress and deformation exaggerated 3X). 
 
 
 
 
 
Global failure occurs at a 
similar location and in a 
similar manner as the test
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Figure 26. Example fail-safe analysis of single stringer with long cracks in both feet (von Mises 
stress and deformation exaggerated 5X).  Note the global failure occurs at a similar location and 
in a similar manner as the baseline FE model with no cracked stringers. 
 
 
 
match the design drawings.  The portions of the adjacent LOX tank were replaced with portions of the adjacent LH2 
tank, including the forward dome, forward ring frame, and a portion of the forward barrel.  As with the other 
ANSYS models, this model was a half-symmetry model of one stringer (Figure 27).   
Nodal temperatures were mapped onto the ANSYS structural model to evaluate several time steps within each of 
two transient conditions:  a critical time range during LH2 propellant loading and a time range for the first 175 
seconds of flight after liftoff.   
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Figure 27. FE model of ET stringer near the LH2 tank. 
 
Static analyses were performed using non-linear large deflection with stress stiffening.  Material plasticity was 
not included.  Results were obtained for stringer displacement, aft chord rotation, internal forces in the sidewall of 
the stringer, and stresses in the feet of the stringer (Figure 28).  Four findings were drawn from this effort: 
 The most limiting location/load combination in regard to the propensity for stringer cracking was determined 
to be at fastener location 1 for the LH2 propellant fill transient at the time of 4960 seconds.  The worst case 
LH2 tank flange rotation, stringer tensile radial force, and stringer tensile tangential stress all occurred at this 
location and transient time.  At this time in the fill transient, the average fastener location 1 temperature was 
still relatively warm at 11° F.   
 The most limiting location for ascent in regard to the propensity for stringer cracking was determined to be at 
fastener location 3 at transient time equal to T+175 seconds.  The stringer tensile radial force and stringer 
tensile tangential stress are approximately 14% and 8% less (respectively) than the worst case values resulting 
at fastener location 1 for the fill transient. However, the average temperature at fastener location 3 was still 
relatively cold at -254° F compared to the 11° F temperature at fastener location 1.  Note that material testing 
by the FAT indicated a trend of decreasing fracture toughness with decreasing temperature [18].  For this 
reason, it could not be decisively concluded that the fill transient was a bounding event at fastener location 3.  
Otherwise, the fill transient was generally a bounding event, and was a significant bounding event at fastener 
locations 1 and 2.   
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 The LH2 tank fill loading condition was significantly greater in severity compared to the ascent loading for 
the first 2 fastener locations.  For fastener locations 3 through 6, the ascent loading condition was more 
severe.  Stringer forces and stresses at fastener locations greater than 6 were negligible relative to peak values 
at the other locations. 
 The results indicated that the operational loading at the LH2 tank end of the stringer was significantly greater 
in severity compared to the LOX tank end of the stringer. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Example FE results for stringer radial displacement near the LH2 Tank (left) and 
hoop-direction stress on the under side of the stringer foot (right). 
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V. Root Cause and Flight Rationale 
The stringer failures were concluded to be due to the material capability being less than expected and the stresses 
being greater than expected [19].  The reduction in material capability was attributed to the characteristic out-of-
family fracture toughness behavior observed in the two suspect lots of Al-2090 stringer material from which all 
failed stringers were fabricated.  The exact metallurgical failure phenomenon was never identified.  It is important to 
note that the stringer material satisfied all specification acceptance requirements.   
The greater than expected stresses were attributed to unexpected assembly-induced stresses that combined with 
stresses resulting from cryogenically-induced deflections.  The specific sources and magnitudes of the assembly-
induced stresses were never positively identified, although there was anecdotal evidence of several possible sources 
including geometric irregularities such as the toe down condition described herein, tolerance stack-up conditions 
resulting from the way the stringers were assembled onto the skin panels, and stresses resulting from the lockbolt 
installation process.  A slight material under-thickness may also have contributed to higher than expected stresses.  
(This issue was not new and had been addressed in prior Material Review Boards.)  It is important to note that the 
investigation found no evidence of improper workmanship or non-conforming as-built configuration. 
All five stringers in which cracks were found were repaired.  The remaining Al-2090 stringers were reinforced 
with radius blocks at the LOX end of the stringers.  The SOFI at the LOX tank had to be removed prior to the 
mechanical installation of the radius blocks, and after all radius blocks were installed, the SOFI was reapplied and 
trimmed to flight configuration.  Significant analysis and test efforts concluded that the radius blocks were effective 
in restoring the structural capability, and that they had no detrimental side effects. 
There was significant concern that removing and repairing the SOFI at the LH2 tank interface in order to install 
radius blocks at that end of the stringers would greatly increase the risk of subsequent foam debris during ascent due 
to the increased risk of cryopumping in the repaired foam closeout.  Also, one of the root causes of stringer failure, 
high assembly stresses, was concluded to be less likely to exist at the LH2 tank end of the stringers.  There was 
anecdotal data suggesting that stringer geometric irregularities and tolerance stack-up issues were much less 
prevalent at the LH2 tank end.  Also, no cracks had been detected at the LH2 tank end of the stringers that had been 
inspected.  Analysis suggested that the stringer feet near the two end-most fasteners experienced their highest 
loading during the prelaunch transient tanking environment. Furthermore, other analyses indicated fail-safe 
capability against structural collapse should cracks initiate.  Therefore, the Space Shuttle Program chose to leave the 
LH2 tank end of the stringers as-is.   
The determination of the structural factor of safety presented a challenge heading into the flight readiness 
reviews.  How to calculate the factor of safety was the source of some debate within the Shuttle community as there 
were differing opinions on what failure criterion to use, what material allowable to use, and what upper bound to use 
for assembly-induced stresses.  Different methods of calculating the factor of safety were presented at the flight 
readiness reviews.  Consensus was not obtained on any one method of calculation, but consensus was obtained that 
the structure was flight worthy.  However, the Space Shuttle Program Requirements Control Board (PRCB) 
officially documented acceptance of waivers to the standard ET factor of safety requirement and to the requirement 
on the calculation of ultimate combined loads [20]. 
The final Flight Readiness Review for STS-133 was held on February 18, 2011.  The flight readiness rationale 
was based on the main points summarized herein, but there was more in-depth discussion of the substantiating data, 
including the findings of Lockheed Martin, the Material FAT, and the NESC.  The Review Board voted 
unanimously to proceed for flight.  There were no dissenting opinions.  STS-133 successfully launched on February 
24, 2011, beginning the final mission of the Space Shuttle Discovery prior to decommissioning.  There were no 
indications of ET stringer issues during prelaunch, liftoff, or ascent. 
The suspect stringer material issue also affected ET-122 and ET-138, the two ETs slated to fly on the final two 
Space Shuttle missions, STS-134 and STS-135.  Prior to the launch of STS-133, the Program had already initiated 
installation of the radius blocks on each of those tanks.  ET-122 was ultimately concluded to have been built prior to 
the introduction of suspect stringer material into the production line, but by the time of that conclusion, radius block 
installation was completed.  Both STS-134 and STS-135 successfully launched with no stringer issues. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
The efforts of the MSFC stress team contributed substantially to the ET cracked stringer investigation, both in 
understanding the structural response of the stringers to determine failure cause and in providing data supporting the 
structural airworthiness of the repaired tank.  By working independently of, but cooperatively with Lockheed 
Martin, the MSFC stress team was able to concur with their findings and recommendations.  Two of the MSFC 
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stress team efforts were specifically requested by the NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager to be presented as part 
of the final STS-133 Flight Readiness Review – the ANSYS FE analysis of the stringers with and without radius 
blocks, and the stringer bending static load test results.  The ability to design and build a test apparatus capable of re-
creating the same stringer failure mode as observed on ET-137 was described by one member of the Flight 
Readiness Review Board as “high class innovation” [21].  The entire MSFC effort serves as a case study on the 
importance of maintaining a strong internal engineering capability for analysis and testing at the Center to 
complement the capabilities of the prime contractors.  
This synopsis of the investigation highlights the efforts of only one small team within the overall investigative 
effort, which is not intended to diminish the importance of the large volume of work conducted by other teams and 
organizations such as the Material FAT, Lockheed Martin, United Space Alliance, and participating organizations 
within NASA.  It was only through the combined efforts of all of these organizations that the Space Shuttle Program 
was able to safely resolve the stringer problem and complete the final shuttle missions to bring the Program to a 
successful end. 
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